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Abstract
This article discusses the phenomenon of volunteer organizations supporting 
Joko Widodo – better known as Jokowi – in Surakarta and the surrounding 
area during Indonesia's 2014 presidential election. This research is important 
because, although volunteerism has been commonly replicated since Barack 
Obama's victories in the 2008 and 2012 American presidential elections, proﬁles 
of volunteers (their identities, motivations and self-deﬁnitions of their activities) 
and their activities (how they organize carry out and fund them) are still largely 
unknown. The article aims to address this lack of research within both the con-
text of political transformation in Indonesia as well as the broader context of 
volunteerism, and to show how it contributes to democratization in Indonesia.
This article reveals that volunteerism as a movement crosses class, age, ideological 
and gender boundaries, while its organizational form at the local level seems to be 
based on class, gender and/or age. Through their organizational models, activi-
ties, approaches and motives, volunteers have restored activism and volunteer-
ism to Indonesian political processes. Nonetheless, this article cannot be certain 
of the movement's contribution to the development of Indonesian democracy. 
Keywords: Election volunteers, volunteerism, democracy, Surakarta, Indonesia
Introduction 
This article discusses the phenomenon of volunteers supporting Joko 
Widodo – better known as Jokowi – in his 2014 presidential election 
campaign against Prabowo Subianto, which he won with 53.15 per 
cent of the vote. The research focuses on the volunteerism in Jokowi's 
hometown, Surakarta, and the surrounding areas known collectively 
as Greater Solo (covering Sragen, Karanganyar, Wonogiri, Sukoharjo, 
Klaten and Boyolali). This site has been selected because Surakarta 
was where Jokowi was born and where he began his political career. 
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He served two terms as the city's mayor (2005–2010 and 2010–2012). 
Furthermore, Surakarta is a stronghold of the Indonesian Democratic 
Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrat Indonesia (PDI), renamed PDI-P on 
1 February 1999), which backed Jokowi in the 2005 Surakartan mayoral 
election, the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election and the 2014 Indone-
sian presidential election. This city was also chosen owing to historical 
considerations, as Surakarta has frequently been the locus of important 
socio-political movements, even before Indonesia's independence. In 
this city, a number of modern political organizations came to life. Here, 
too, modern political methods and techniques such as boycotts, open 
political meetings and rallies, as well as modern political jargon, were 
introduced before spreading to other cities in Indonesia (Larson 1990; 
Shiraishi 1997; Suhartono 1991). 
Investigation into volunteerism is important because such research 
has remained uncommon despite volunteerism becoming increasingly 
common following its successful use by Barack Obama in the 2008 and 
2012 American presidential elections. We are yet to see a comprehensive 
proﬁle of volunteers – who they are, what are their motives, how they 
see themselves and deﬁne themselves. We are also yet to encounter 
sufﬁcient coverage of their activities – how they organize themselves, 
how they work and how they fund their activities. This article intends 
to answer the above questions while also examining how and to what 
extent volunteers have contributed to democratization in Indonesia.
Research for this article was conducted by a team from the Depart-
ment of Politics and Government at the Faculty of Social and Political 
Sciences, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Research 
examined the different tendencies of volunteers supporting Jokowi in 
three different areas – Jakarta, Surabaya and Surakarta – and was con-
ducted over four months immediately following the presidential election 
(9 July 2014). Field research in Surakarta was conducted from August 
to September 2014. The snowball technique was used to identify and 
contact the subjects of this research: one respondent gives the name of 
another, who in turn provides the name of a third, and so on. 
From Volunteerism to Electoral Volunteerism
Discussion of volunteer movements is important for several reasons. 
First, the presence of volunteers in political campaigns indicates a fun-
damental shift in volunteerism's character, from individual and non-
political – romantic, idealistic and altruistic (Mowen and Sujan 2005) – to 
_________________________________________________________________________81
______________________________________________________ Hometown Volunteers
highly political. Efforts to involve volunteers in politics and improve 
the quality of democracy have a lengthy history. Alexis de Tocqueville's 
two-volume classic work Democracy in America (originally published in 
1835 and 1840, in French) introduced the concept of 'public association 
in civil life', in which social qualities such as feelings of reciprocity, 
loyalty to fellow citizens, imagination regarding the possibility of a 
better life, and the potential to overcome problems and become useful 
citizens capable of growth and development become the basis for civil 
participation that can guarantee functional democracy (Verba et al. 
1995). However, the transformation of such volunteerism into support 
for candidates – presidential or otherwise – brings the method outside 
its traditional understanding as individual 'leisure behaviour' (Bull 
1971; Kelly 1972) shaped through a long and repetitive process. This 
is reﬂected in studies by Omoto and Snyder (1995: 683–684) as well 
as Penner and Finkelstein (1998: 526–527), who have identiﬁed volun-
teer movements in a formal organizational context oriented towards 
manifesting solidarity (Cnaan et al. 1996). As will be shown through the 
cases of pro-Jokowi volunteerism in Surakarta, this shift also deviates 
from the characterization of volunteerism as 'non-obligatory helping' 
in which 'actions are not motivated by a sense of personal obligation to 
a personal recipient' (Cicognani and Zani 2015: 126). 
Second, this phenomenon represents a shift within the tradition of 
electoral democracy, one that breaks from the conventional framework 
that prioritizes political parties. In an Indonesian context, the presi-
dential election regime implemented in 2004 was a crucial part of the 
momentum for ending party elites' monopoly on authority in selecting 
the president through the People's Consultative Assembly, then the 
highest decision-making body in Indonesia. This momentum created 
new spaces for involving the public in promoting the development of 
civil society (Lay 2017a: 1–24) without them having to join a political 
party or bear the associated negative stigma. Volunteer groups arose in 
this period and became some of the most dynamic and prominent actors 
in the 2014 presidential election. The rise of direct presidential elections 
also meant the end of the longstanding dominance of state–corporate 
relations, which allowed the establishment of new, more democratic 
political linkages (Lay 2017b: 130–150).
However, the emergence of volunteer movements in Indonesia cannot 
be attributed solely to the domestic political transformations described 
above as global developments following Obama's successful campaign 
in the 2008 American presidential election, which relied on volunteerism 
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were also inﬂuential (Ganz 2009; Han and McKinna 2015; Presta 2010). 
Obama's continued use of volunteerism in his successful 2012 campaign 
reafﬁrmed this method's effectiveness. After Obama's election, volun-
teers, long viewed as 'burdens', have been treated as important 'assets' 
by those who have attempted to replicate his approach around the globe, 
including in emerging democracies. 
The replication of Obama's reliance on volunteerism has occurred 
at the national level not only in Indonesia, with Jokowi as the central 
ﬁgure, but also in the 2014 elections in South Africa and the 2015 elec-
tions in Canada (Bryden 2015).1 Furthermore, volunteerism has not been 
limited to the national level, penetrating also into local elections, as seen 
in Odessa, Ukraine (Holmov 2015).2 In Indonesia, reliance on volunteer-
ism was seen most recently with the 'Friends of Ahok' ('Teman Ahok') 
(Riana 2016),3 a group of volunteers campaigning (albeit unsuccessfully) 
for Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, better known as Ahok, to become Gover-
nor of Jakarta in the 2017 election.4 Unfortunately, these developments 
have yet to be explored satisfactorily. In Indonesia, only Suaedy (2014), 
Sefsani and Ziegenhain (2015: 14–33) and Lay (2017c:31–61) have used 
academic approaches in an attempt to analyse this phenomenon. 
Surakarta: Hometown of Jokowi, PDI-P Stronghold
Jokowi belied the Indonesian idiom 'tak ada pahlawan yang dihargai 
di rumah sendiri' ('no hero is honoured at home') by receiving 84.36 
per cent of votes in the 2014 presidential election in his hometown, 
Surakarta (Damanik 2014). This was far above his national average of 
53.15 per cent (Sinaga 2014).5 As will be shown below, this victory was 
realized through a lengthy process of proving his abilities, which has 
frequently been cited as the reason for volunteer groups and individuals 
supporting him in Greater Surakarta. 
Jokowi was born in Surakarta on 21 June 1961. Unusually for a politi-
cian in Indonesia, he was not born to a family of politicians, bureaucrats 
or soldiers. His father, Notomihardjo, was a carpenter, while his mother, 
Sujiatmi Notomihardjo, was a housewife. After completing his bacca-
laureate degree at the Faculty of Forestry, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 
Jokowi opened a furniture business. His political career began when he 
was elected Mayor of Surakarta, with F.X. Hadi Rudyatmo (best known 
as Rudy) as his running mate, in the 2005 election. He received 36.62 per 
cent of votes, defeating the other three candidates.6 Jokowi and Rudy 
recognized that, owing to their relatively small margin, they needed 
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to consolidate their position. They did so by implementing techno-
populist policies that developed a sense of collective identity among 
the residents of Surakarta. Jokowi launched a tourism programme in 
which Surakarta was advertised as being 'the Spirit of Java'. This cre-
ated a sense of togetherness among city residents, expanding Jokowi's 
political base. These programmes were complemented by using Rudy's 
unique position – he was a charismatic ﬁgure, the leader of the Surakarta 
branch of PDI-P, and had broad, stable networks – to connect Jokowi 
to the grassroots. Both men were also skilled at effectively utilizing ex-
isting political linkages between the government and citizens' groups 
(Pratikno and Lay 2013). 
This combination of approaches can be seen from policies enacted 
by Jokowi during the relocation of almost a thousand sellers of used 
(and sometimes stolen) goods from Taman Monumen 45 Banjarsari to 
Notoharjo. Facing hard-line resistance, Jokowi resolved issues through 
dialogue, holding no fewer than 54 lunches with these used goods sellers. 
Praised as nguwongke wong – humanizing people – this approach was not 
only successful in establishing a consensus in a peaceful and digniﬁed 
manner, but also set a new standard for political leaders' interactions 
with constituents. This in turn meant increased effectiveness in policy 
implementation and improved public legitimacy, as evidenced by the 
relocation's then completion after almost nine years of obstruction. 
Following the relocation, Jokowi became Indonesia's media darling, 
and his popularity surged to unprecedented heights. The concurrent 
widespread adoption of social media in Indonesia facilitated the spread 
of the 'Jokowi effect', especially among the urban middle classes.
This populism, marked by strong connections between government 
leaders and their constituents and realized through problem solving-ori-
ented policies, led to Jokowi being considered the ultimate representative 
of the lower classes. In the Surakarta mayoral election of 2010, Jokowi and 
Rudy received an overwhelming 90.09 per cent of votes, winning at 931 
of the 932 ballot stations. The only other candidates, Eddy Wirabhumi 
and his running mate Supradi Kertamenawi, backed by the Democratic 
Party (Partai Demokrat) and Working Groups Party (Golkar), received 
only 9.91 per cent of votes. On 28 July 2010, Jokowi was inaugurated as 
mayor of Surakarta for the 2010–2015 term (Sodiq 2010).7
At the national level, Jokowi's political career became more prominent 
after PDI-P nominated him as its candidate, paired with Basuki Tjahaja 
Purnama, in the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election. Initially, the residents 
of Surakarta were divided in their response to Jokowi's willingness to 
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accept this nomination, to the point that some challenged his candidacy 
in court (Satriawan 2012).8 However, the people of Surakarta largely sup-
ported him. Merchants at the Notoharjo used goods market, for instance, 
gathered voluntary contributions to be donated to Jokowi's campaign. 
Other activities were held throughout the city, including congregational 
prayers, signatures and ﬁngerprints being collected on a stretch of white 
cloth by the Facebookers Community for Jokowi; and a banquet-sharing 
ceremony held by the merchants. When Jokowi was inaugurated, the 
people of Surakarta expressed their excitement (Bramantyo 2012).9
Jokowi's impressive achievement cannot be separated from the role of 
the parties supporting him. Surakarta, aside from its status as Jokowi's 
hometown and long history of political activism, is a stronghold of 
PDI-P, the political party that discovered and nominated Jokowi. This 
can be seen in the election results under Suharto's New Order: unlike 
in national parliamentary elections, in which the PDI-P always ﬁnished 
last, this party consistently came in second, behind Golkar, in elections 
for the regional parliament of Surakarta. This is readily evident from 
the data shown in Table 1. 
TABLE 1. Comparison of Votes Received in the National General 
Election (DPR) and the DPRD of Surakarta, %
E l e c t i o n
Golkar PDI PPP
DPR DPRD DPR DPRD DPR DPRD
1977 62.11 50.75 8.60 32.11 29.29 17.44
1982 63.64 55.20 7.88 27.07 27.78 17.73
1987 73.16 53.98 10.87 31.45 15.97 14.57
1992 68.10  4 8 . 3 1 14.89 36.41 17.01 15.28
1997 74.51 56.17 3.06 3.31 22.43 40.52
Source: Ofﬁce of Society and Politics, Municipality of Surabaya, quoted in Adnan (2002: 44–45)
In the election of the New Order in 1997, PDI-P saw a drastic down-
turn, receiving only 3.31 per cent of the vote; this can be attributed to 
supporters boycotting the elections in protest at the government's mis-
treatment of the party, particularly its violent ejection of central ﬁgure 
and chairwoman Megawati Sukarnoputri (Kaligis 2015).10 In the ﬁrst 
election of the Reformasi era, held on 7 June 1999 and contested by 48 
parties, PDI-P received the greatest share of the national vote (33.74 per 
cent), followed by Golkar, at 22.44 per cent, and the Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan (United Development Party; PPP), at 10.71 per cent (Com-
mittee for General Elections 2008).11 Though results in Surakarta were 
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similar, PDI-P's victory was more deﬁnitive: it received 56.7 per cent of 
votes. This led to a dramatic change in the city's political conﬁguration: 
PDI-P held 24 of the 45 seats in the regional parliament, whereas Golkar 
and PPP only held three seats each. Although Golkar won nationally in 
the 2004 election, PDI-P maintained its stronghold in Surakarta, receiv-
ing 35.9 per cent of the vote; by comparison, Golkar only received 11.1 
per cent locally. 
In the 2009 election, at the national level the winner was the Partai 
Demokrat, a relatively young party that had run in only one previous 
election. It received 20.85 per cent of the vote, a nearly 300 per cent in-
crease over the previous election (7.455 per cent). Golkar came in second 
place, with 14.45 per cent of the vote, and PDI-P followed in third with 
14.03 per cent. This differed signiﬁcantly from the situation in Surakarta, 
where PDI-P remained dominant, receiving 37.5 per cent of the vote (15 
seats). The Partai Demokrat came second, with 17.5 per cent (7 seats), 
pushing aside Golkar, which only received 10 per cent of the vote (4 
seats). In the 2014 general election, PDI-P rebounded, winning the ma-
jority of the national vote (18.95 per cent), followed by Golkar at 14.75 
per cent and the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerakan Indonesia 
Raya; Gerindra) at 11.81 per cent. The Partai Demokrat came in fourth. 
Similar results were reported in Surakarta; however, the gap between 
parties was dramatic. PDI-P received more than half of the vote (51.25 
per cent). Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), the National Mandate Party, 
came in second place, with 7.65 per cent of the vote, followed by Ger-
indra at 7.20 per cent, and the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera) at 6.58 per cent (Sunaryo 2014).12
Models, Proﬁles and Activities of Volunteer Movements
Generally, the volunteer groups supporting Jokowi in Surakarta followed 
one of two organizational patterns. First there were those organized as 
part of a national volunteer movement. Groups following this model 
positioned local volunteers as expansions, extensions or satellites of Ja-
karta-based national volunteer organizations. Second there were locally 
organized volunteer organizations. This model had three different vari-
ants: (1) volunteers with a basis in local networks/organizations, (2) those 
with a basis in a certain 'territory' and (3) people acting on an individual 
basis, with no group afﬁliation. This model was followed predominantly 
by PDI-P or Jokowi supporters who acted of their own volition, without 
coordination or instruction from any group or political party. 
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Despite differences between these models and their variants, volun-
teer organizations shared certain similarities. They were all peer groups, 
with a high level of intimacy, and founded on principles of trust. As 
citizens, they were mostly politically passive – be it because they were 
uninterested in politics or because they had withdrawn from politics 
during the authoritarian New Order – but had the knowledge and 
imagination to dream of ideal politics and leadership. Their decision 
to become volunteers derived from a combination of factors, including 
Jokowi's own charisma, his capacity to deliver concrete programmes 
as well as his position as a 'new ﬁgure' originating from outside poli-
tics, the bureaucracy and the military – channels traditionally used by 
Indonesian leadership. Furthermore, these volunteers were similar in 
that they used their own funds, in that any support was sporadic and 
not given in cash, and in that they worked intermittently – barring those 
whose efforts were based on control over a speciﬁc area or territory 
– and used information technology intensively. 
This research identiﬁes two faces of volunteerism, namely as or-
ganization and as movement. As will be discussed in detail below, 
such volunteer movements were signiﬁcantly different in character. In 
terms of a movement, volunteerism has diverse proﬁles. They do not 
represent speciﬁc social classes or age groups, nor are they shaped along 
ideological, identity or gender lines. Diverse groups worked together 
to realize a shared goal: Jokowi's electoral victory. However, organiza-
tion-level volunteerism is delineated in terms of class, gender and age. 
Moreover, this research shows that, owing to the rise of digital technol-
ogy, volunteers have generally been exposed to the latest information 
on politics. They are easily connected with each other, able to contact 
each other readily, quickly and cheaply through electronic platforms. 
This eased efforts to consolidate volunteer work. As the discussion 
will demonstrate, although the number of pro-Jokowi volunteers was 
limited – generally six to ten per group – their cleverness in selecting 
activities/issues, media and approaches led to them becoming colossi 
both on the internet and in the city. 
Model 1. Satellite of National Volunteer Organization
Viewed in terms of their organizational models, several pro-
Jokowi volunteer groups in Surakarta were part of national vol-
unteer groups, serving as satellites of these larger bodies. Here 
we discuss three prominent examples of such groups: Formation 
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of Volunteers for President Jokowi (Barisan Relawan Jokowi 
Presiden; BARA JP), National Secretariat of Youths Supporting 
Jokowi (Seknas Muda Jokowi) and the People's Central Command 
Post (Posko Center Rakyat; POSTERA), as shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2. Forms of National Volunteer Organization Satellites
No
Name of 
Organiza-
tion
Member-
ship
Work 
methods
Financing
Relation 
with other 
organiza-
tions
1 BARA JP
Banker 
peer group
Door-to-
door 
Social me-
dia
Member-
ship dues
Indepen-
dent 
2
Seknas 
Muda 
Jokowi
University 
students
Door-to-
door 
Social me-
dia
Movie 
screening
Individual 
party activ-
ist 
Dependent 
3 POSTERA
Loose 
member-
ship
Door-to-
door 
Cultural 
activities
Individual 
member 
Indepen-
dent 
BARA JP Surakarta (Barisan Relawan Jokowi Presiden, 
Formation of Volunters for President Jokowi)
BARA JP Surakarta (henceforth BARA JP) was established in February 
2014 on the initiative of Indra Kramadipa, a construction materials seller 
from Boyolali. Indra was relatively new to politics, ﬁrst becoming in-
volved when he participated in the World Congress of Jokowi Volunteer 
Supporters (Kongres Relawan Jokowi Sedunia), held at the Indonesia 
Menggugat Building in Bandung on 15 June 2013; a few months later, he 
began to set up BARA JP. In February 2014, Indra asked Kukuh Hendra, 
an employee of the Pundi Bank of Surakarta, to join; he, in turn, invited 
some 15 colleagues (interview with M. Soﬁudin, 10 August 2014).
BARA JP's members are middle-class professionals, who work at 
several banks in Surakarta. Politically, they had previously been passive 
citizens because they considered politics immoral. Furthermore, they 
were not afﬁliated with any political parties. As such, their volunteer 
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involvement was their ﬁrst experience in politics. Aside from Indra, the 
initiator, only one member had previous volunteer experience: Soﬁu-
din, a bank employee who had volunteered for Jokowi before through 
the Jokowi–Ahok Social Media Volunteers (Jasmev) during the 2012 
gubernatorial election,13 as well as the Garuda Social Media Volunteers 
(Relawan Garuda Social Media).14 At the time of writing, Soﬁudin is the 
secretary general of BARA JP. 
Volunteers organized themselves and their activities simply, using 
a WhatsApp (WA) group that had previously been dedicated to the 
distribution of social/general information. During the tense lead-up to 
the 2014 presidential election, this WA group transformed into a forum 
for exchanging information on politics. It subsequently became a me-
dium for recruiting members: more than 20 members joined BARA JP 
in this way. Many bank employees joined because they had previously 
planned to establish their own group in support of Jokowi, whom they 
considered a straightforward ﬁgure and close to the people. The invi-
tation to join BARA JP gave them this opportunity without requiring 
the establishment of a new organization (interview with M. Soﬁudin, 
14 August 2014). This challenges the common view that urban middle 
classes are innately passive and lack any political awareness. Borrowing 
from Amna and Ekman (2013: 1–21), they can in fact be considered as 
'standby citizens' ready to transform into active political actors if given 
the proper motive and momentum.15 
BARA JP exploited primordial sentiments by promoting Jokowi as 'the 
presidential candidate from Surakarta', referring implicitly to Pacitan, 
whence came President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). Pacitan's 
development was viewed as being a direct result of SBY becoming 
president, and such development could thus be replicated for Surakarta 
should the city elect a local candidate (interview with Kukuh, Deputy 
Chair of BARA JP, 20 August 2014). It mainly targeted rural voters, 
particularly in Sukoharjo, whom it considered easily inﬂuenced by the 
negative rumours spread by Jokowi's opponents. Its second target was 
members of the public. Thus, the organization campaigned door-to-
door, using brochures, shirts, stickers, tabloid papers and banners to 
reach rural voters, as well as social media to connect with urban voters 
(interview with M. Soﬁudin, 14 August 2014).
BARA JP Surakarta was an 'expansion' of the national BARA JP.16 
However, this was more in name only than an empiric reality. The re-
search for this article has conﬁrmed that the relations between the two 
were far from reﬂective of an organizational hierarchy. Each organiza-
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tion worked separately, with limited coordination and communication. 
This can be attributed to the local organization's independent funding, 
which came from members' dues. For example, promotional material 
such as tabloids, stickers, shirts and banners were purchased using 
weekly membership dues. According to its records, BARA JP only 
received 100 shirts from the national organization, with shipping cov-
ered by the local branch (interview with Kukuh, 24 August 2014). This 
organization held routine meetings every Friday evening to discuss the 
activities planned for the following week. As the organization lacked 
headquarters, meetings were held at restaurants, while BlackBerry Mes-
senger and WA groups were used for coordinating members (interview 
with M. Soﬁudin, 18 August 2014).
Seknas Muda Jokowi (National Secretariat of Youths 
Supporting Jokowi)
Seknas Muda Jokowi was a bloc of the national Seknas Jokowi.17 This 
organization was declared on 3 May 2014 in Surakarta. Volunteers were 
mostly students and this group was also initiated by an individual activ-
ist, Tiead Gilham, a student at Sebelas Maret University, Surakarta, who 
became the organization's leader. His involvement could be attributed 
more to friendship than political awareness. Gilham was invited to join 
by a friend from Jakarta named Yulius. Relying on his personal ties, he 
invited his classmates, including Topik and Chyntia Putri. An organi-
zational administration soon took form and was reported to the central 
organization. This evidences the importance of 'trust' in this group's es-
tablishment. It is thus not surprising that recruitment of the organization's 
16 members – eight of whom were highly active – used a word of mouth 
model that ensured familiarity among members. The organization also 
attempted to recruit members via Facebook, a less personal approach, 
but was unsuccessful (interview with Gilham, 26 August 2014). 
All members of Seknas Muda were ﬁrst-time volunteers, without any 
previous experience of activism or political parties. Hoping that Jokowi 
could bring change, they decided to become volunteers. However, 
unlike other groups, who relied entirely on Jokowi's charisma, Seknas 
Muda considered another factor: Jokowi's surroundings. As stated by 
Gilham, they became volunteers because they saw that 'Jokowi, as a new 
ﬁgure, was surrounded by innocent people' (interview with Gilham, 27 
August 2014).
As with other volunteer groups, Seknas Muda conducted door-
to-door campaigning as its main method. It was active not only in 
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Surakarta, but also Karanganyar and Wonogiri. It also utilized public 
spaces to voice its support. In Surakarta, for instance, it campaigned 
through oration and the distribution of stickers at Klewer Market, a 
large traditional market and batik bazaar. It also gave free takjil during 
the Ramadan fast.18 On 25 May 2014, this group offered 'Free Shirts of 
Inspiring Indonesian Leaders' ('Sablon Gratis Tokoh Inspiratif Indo-
nesia') to commemorate National Awakening Day. This activity was 
intended to inspire reﬂection on the leadership of inspirational ﬁgures 
such as Jokowi. Seknas Muda also held several activities in Matesih, 
Karanganyar and Wonogiri. It distributed promotional kitchen knives, 
stickers and banners. In Wonogiri, it screened a ﬁlm about Jokowi (in-
terview with Nugroho, Presidium of Seknas Muda Jokowi Surakarta, 
29 August 2014). It also worked with another pro-Jokowi volunteer 
group, POSTERA (see below).19 Unlike BARA JP, it was quite active on 
social media, operating Facebook and Twitter accounts that functioned 
to share information and recruit members. 
Seknas Muda received logistical aid from several actors. It received 
shirts, stickers, brochures and magazines from the central Seknas Jokowi 
administration. Furthermore, it received ﬁnancial aid from a member 
of Surakarta's parliament, Paulus Hartoyo (PDI-P), as well as shirts and 
pins from a member of the national parliament, Arya Bima.20 Although 
it received aid, it was also self-sufﬁcient in funding, particularly for 
its routine expenses (food, gasoline, etc.). It also worked with PDI-P 
through the Team of Nine, formally active at the municipal, district and 
sub-district levels. At several places in Serengan, for example, the party 
offered 'campaign specialists' as well as material aid (interview with 
Hartoyo, member of local parliament, 10 September 2014 and Krisna-
mukti, member of local parliament, 11 September 2014). Seknas Muda 
Jokowi Surakarta met routinely, three to four times a week. Meetings 
were held at restaurants, as the organization had no headquarters. 
POSTERA (Posko Center Rakyat, People's Central Command 
Post)
Posko Center Rakyat Jokowi Surakarta – henceforth the Center – a 
chapter of the national POSTERA movement, was established on 1 
January 2014. Unlike the above two groups, the Center was initiated by 
a national activist, Agus Widiarto. He was one of the founders of the 
national POSTERA movement and lived in Surakarta. Together with J. 
Dasanta, he operated the Center out of the Manahan district (interview 
with Dasanta, head of POSTERA Central Java, 27 August 2014).
_________________________________________________________________________91
______________________________________________________ Hometown Volunteers
No detailed proﬁle exists of the volunteers involved in this organiza-
tion. Although the Center claims 1,200 members of all social and age 
groups, only six to ten of them are active. POSTERA issued identity cards 
for its members; aside from serving as proof of membership, these also 
prevented members from joining other groups. This indicates another 
dimension of volunteerism: inter-group competition.
Because POSTERA was formally established before Jokowi became 
a presidential candidate, its early focus was on mobilizing support for 
his candidacy. Activities shifted to promoting Jokowi's electoral victory 
after he was nominated by PDI-P;21 and shifted again to monitoring and 
supporting the government after Jokowi's election. To promote Jokowi's 
candidacy with PDI-P, the Center mobilized support by collecting sig-
natures. Meanwhile, to promote victory in the election, it put on several 
cultural events, including stage performances near its headquarters in 
Manahan as well as at Manahan Stadium. It also carried out door-to-door 
canvassing, distributing brochures and shirts, as well as plant seedlings (a 
common practice in Indonesian campaigns). In each activity, POSTERA 
emphasized that voting for Jokowi was a form of worship (interview 
with Agus Widiarto, Head of the Center, 27 August 2014). Unfortunately, 
none of its planned activities intended to monitor/support the Jokowi 
government once in power have been realized. 
Financially, this group differed signiﬁcantly from others in that its 
funding originated from a single source: Dasanta, who claimed to have 
spent some 286 million rupiah (equivalent to US$21,000). The reason 
the Center did not receive assistance from other parties was not clearly 
articulated. However, it appears that Dasanta wanted total control over 
the group. As with BARA JP, the Center was linked to the national-level 
POSTERA, but there was no coordination between the two (interview 
with Dasanta, 3 September 2014). In May 2014, the Center began involv-
ing 17 other volunteer groups in its large-scale activities, during which 
each organization ﬂew its own banner.
The Center utilized an interesting organizational model. One the one 
hand it presented itself as a national network, but on the other hand 
its approaches and funding were highly individual. This appears to be 
linked to Dasanta's position on volunteers, whom he viewed as being 
civilians who are protesting the political system (including politics). In 
presidential elections, volunteers thus seek the best leader. However, 
at the individual level volunteering has a speciﬁc function: 'giving 
personal satisfaction when a candidate wins' (interview with Dasanta, 
4 September 2014).
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Model 2: Independent Local-Based Volunteers
The second pattern found in Surakarta is the manifestation of local 
volunteer organizations. Those following this model are completely 
initiated by local actors. They have minimal contact with or inﬂuence 
from national-level organizations. Several examples, representing three 
important variants of this model in Surakarta, are discussed here and 
shown in Table 3. The ﬁrst two case studies represent the network/
organization-based variant; the third case represents the territorial-
based variant; and the ﬁnal two cases represent the individual-based 
variant.
Network/Organization-Based Volunteers
Wijaya Kusuma
In Grogol, Sukoharjo, on the border between Sukoharjo and Surakarta, 
there emerged a volunteer organization named Wijaya Kusuma, which 
was derived from the micro-ﬁnancial institution of the same name. 
Wijaya Kusuma has been active in savings and loans since 2013, with 
180 members spread throughout 14 villages (interview with Suhasto, 
Head of Wijaya Kusuma, 15 August 2014). Members are loyal support-
ers of PDI-P, having regularly voted for this party in elections. This 
volunteer group was launched on 1 June 2014, less than a month before 
the presidential election, having been inspired by Jokowi's populist 
style of leadership. More than that, however, members were united in 
terms of class and regional solidarity. Jokowi's origins among the lower 
classes of Solo – their own socio-economic and regional origins – was 
the main reference point for these individuals when making the decision 
to volunteer, along with their party identiﬁcation. Although they had 
little time, they still organized several activities, including gathering 
signatures from New Solo residents, collecting 1,000 rupiah (less than 
US$0.10) notes for Jokowi, and door-to-door campaigning. To increase 
their effectiveness, they divided themselves into territorial units, with 
each village coordinated by one person. Fourteen village coordinators 
were active in Grogol District, all of whom distributed pamphlets, stick-
ers, pins and banners to provide residents with information. 
Wijaya Kusuma once worked with BARA JP, when the two volunteer 
groups collaborated on an action at the New Solo Roundabout. The 
former also received pamphlets from BARA JP, which were used to reach 
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TABLE 3. Forms of Independent Local-Based Volunteers
No Types of Volunteer
Member-
ship
Work 
Methods
Financing
Relation 
with other 
organiza-
tions
1
Network 
Organi-
zations-
Based 
Volunteers
Wijaya 
Kusuma
Peer group 
Door-
to-door 
campaign
Distributed 
pamphlets, 
stickers, 
pins, ban-
ners
Fundrais-
ing
Member-
ship dues
Donation
Dependent 
Sahabat 
Jokowi 
(Friends of 
Jokowi)
Loose 
member-
ship
Focused 
on online 
activities 
Distributed 
stickers, 
magazines, 
movie 
Founder 
and his col-
leagues
Indepen-
dent
2
Territo-
rial-Based 
Volunteers
Kampung 
Relawan 
Jokowi
(Village of 
Volunteers 
for Jokowi)
Residents 
of Kam-
pong Gam-
birsari
Consolidate 
voters ter-
ritorially
Residents 
dues
Indepen-
dent
3
Individual-
Based 
Volunteers
Mayor 
Haristanto
Sporadic
Held exhi-
bition
By himself 
and with 
colleagues
Indepen-
dent
Sri Muly-
aningsih
Sporadic
Door-to-
door 
Social 
media
By herself Dependent 
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potential voters. Wijaya Kusuma received no logistic aid from political 
parties or from outside actors; all its activities and logistics were funded 
through membership dues. In fact, it assisted PDI-P in establishing posts 
in several villages. Wijaya Kusuma argued that, by supporting Jokowi, 
it would bring its members prosperity. As with other groups, members 
understood their volunteer activities as needing no recompense. 
Sahabat Jokowi (Friends of Jokowi) 
Sahabat Jokowi was a local-based volunteer group established on the 
initiative of Eddy Pramono, who also served as its chair.22 Pramono was a 
well-known local ﬁgure active in various ﬁelds. He owned a photography 
studio, taught as a guest lecturer at Slamet Riyadi University, Surakarta, 
and served as an advertising consultant for legislative and executive can-
didates. Pramono had been close to Jokowi since 2005, when he served as 
photographer for Jokowi's mayoral campaign team. He has continued to 
photograph Jokowi during the latter's activities in Surakarta.
Sahabat Jokowi targeted young and ﬁrst-time voters. As such, it was 
most active on social networks such as Facebook, which it used for public 
outreach. Aside from its ability to reach young voters, social media was 
selected because of its expedience and ease of access. Social media was 
also selected to ﬁll gaps that received no attention from other political 
parties. To organize its activities, the group engaged nine volunteers, 
working shifts and thus ensuring 24-hour activity. They monitored 
and utilized material from posts on the pro-Jokowi group Facebooker 
Lovers for Jokowi. 
Although it focused on online activities, Sahabat Jokowi was also 
involved in campaigning ofﬂine. A prominent example was its brand-
ing of a Volkswagen with Jokowi's image (Figure 1). This car was 
displayed in strategic areas on Car Free Day, a weekly event held on a 
major thoroughfare since 16 May 2010, and drew considerable attention 
from passers-by, who used it as a backdrop for their photos. Many of 
these were uploaded to social media, particularly Facebook, and thus 
promoted knowledge of Jokowi. This group also prepared and distrib-
uted stickers, magazines and ﬁlms about Jokowi to combat rumours 
and provide more diverse information on the candidate (interview with 
Pramono, 2 September 2014).
In his activities, Pramono received aid – particularly ﬁnancial – from 
his friends. One of the cars branded with Jokowi's image came from 
Helmi Yahya, Pramono's colleague in the Surakarta photographers' 
community. Pramono himself donated his time, energy and multime-
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ing a combination of military and religious leadership. However, like 
other volunteer groups, Sahabat Jokowi members saw themselves as 
participating out of their own concern for the nation's fate. They believed 
that, through successful implementation of policy (as previously seen 
in Surakarta), Jokowi could contribute signiﬁcantly to national politics. 
Together with the arguments of the territory-based group discussed 
below, this reveals another dimension of the volunteerism phenomenon: 
it is linked to candidates' programmes and their capacity to deliver said 
programmes. It is thus not solely about candidates' charisma. 
Territory-Based Volunteers 
Kampung Relawan Jokowi (Village of Volunteers for Jokowi) 
Gambirsari, Kadipiro Subdistrict, Banjarsari District, Surakarta, is a 
settlement known as the Kampung Relawan Jokowi. It was initiated 
and declared by residents of RW (a semi-governmental administrative 
structure below the village) 13, Gambirsari, in June 2014, without local 
government or party interference. Residents announced their support 
dia expertise (interview with Pramono, 9 September 2014). Unlike the 
groups mentioned above, who kept their distance from political parties, 
Sahabat Jokowi communicated frequently with PDI-P. Pramono and his 
partners regularly voted for PDI-P and were familiar to party adminis-
trators. However, Sahabat Jokowi kept its distance from other volunteer 
groups – particularly those with ties to Jakarta – to ensure its freedom 
and independence. This group also had a different image of Jokowi. As 
stated by Pramono, he became a volunteer because he believed Jokowi 
to be the perfect 'general' and 'imam' for the future of Indonesia – offer-
FIGURE 1. Jokowi's mother, Sudjiatmi Notomihardjo, with a 
Volkswagen belonging to Sahabat Jokowi
Source: Eddy Pramono
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for Jokowi because they considered him to have been effective as mayor. 
He was considered an exemplary leader, one who often became involved 
in and showed concern for the common people. As one resident stated, 
Jokowi's frequent visits gave them a sense of pride and shared destiny. 
Jokowi had masterminded construction of the Talud irrigation canal, 
pioneered an anti-dengue fever movement, established education parks, 
celebrated the birthdays of the elderly, spearheaded a child-friendly city 
and opened a bridge (interview with Mulyono, planner of Kampung 
Relawan Jokowi, 9 September 2014).
The establishment of Kampung Relawan Jokowi was not as ambitious 
as those of other groups: it was intended solely to consolidate voters 
in this residential area. To do so, they worked together every week, 
particularly near election day, and also established a place for people 
to gather and socialize. Towards the end of June 2014, residents put up 
large photographs of Jokowi and his activities as mayor of Surakarta 
along the road, hoping that residents would remember their progress 
under Jokowi's leadership.
All activities of community members were funded and their equip-
ment purchased by residents themselves. They neither worked with nor 
received aid from other groups. Their activities were likewise limited 
in scope to their own neighbourhood. And their strategy was effective, 
as shown by the fact that Jokowi received 96 per cent of the area's 2,323 
votes – well above his average in Surakarta (84.36 per cent).
Individual-Based Volunteers
The third variant of the local-based organizational model is individual, 
involving persons acting on their own. The following section discusses 
two such actors: Mayor Haristanto and Sri Mulyaningsih, better known 
as Sri Gunting. These two individuals present different proﬁles. 
Mayor Haristanto
Mayor Haristanto, an artist also involved in event organizing and 
advertising, was president of the Creative Headquarters for President 
Jokowi (Posko Kreatif Jokowi Presiden) as well as an active volunteer. 
He supported Jokowi not only during the latter's presidential campaign, 
but also in the mayoral campaign. Although he disapproved of Jokowi's 
plans to run for governor of Jakarta in 2012, he still supported this can-
didate after Jokowi was nominated by PDI-P.
_________________________________________________________________________97
______________________________________________________ Hometown Volunteers
His activities, often unique – including holding a student body elec-
tion at a mall, and setting the records for the most people kissing a ﬂag, 
the most people eating eggs simultaneously, and for the most people 
drawing on the pavement in chalk and so on – have led to him becom-
ing a newsmaker in Surakarta. He holds 31 records from the Indonesian 
Record Museum (Museum Rekor Indonesia, MURI) set over 15 years 
(interview with Haristanto, 9 September 2014). Such approaches were 
intended to draw the interest of the public, which he believed would 
also attract the attention of the mass media. Media coverage afforded 
him the opportunity to reach broader audiences without spending much 
money. This scheme also allowed him to criticize conventional fundrais-
ing techniques, in which the masses are mobilized by political parties. 
According to Haristanto, the conventional approach requires signiﬁcant 
resources and carries great risk but has questionable effectiveness. 
Haristanto's activities were not only politically motivated; they also 
had business aspects. He admitted that, in every volunteer activity, 
he would proudly show the logo of Republik Aeng-Aeng, his event 
organization company, and that this promotion was quite effective. 
Nonetheless, Haristanto emphasized that volunteerism must be sincere. 
As with other volunteers, he viewed Jokowi as a 'nice man' and stated 
FIGURE 2. Photographs of Jokowi posted in the Jokowi Volunteer 
Village
Source: http://www.timlo.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/IMG_2397.jpg
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that the political and economic dimensions of volunteer activities have 
not yet been adequately exploited. 
Unlike the formal procedures of many volunteer groups, Haristanto 
followed no ﬁxed schedule or routine in his activities. He explained 
that he acted as he pleased. If he felt a desire or had an idea, he would 
act. This was possible because he did not rely on others in his activities. 
The ability to act without a schedule is characteristic of individual-based 
volunteerism, as also shown by the experiences of Sri Mulyaningsih. 
However, it must be noted that independence in volunteer activity does 
not mean independence in ﬁnancing. As Haristanto said, although he 
funded his activities himself at ﬁrst, over time he received ﬁnancial aid 
from two entrepreneurs in Surakarta. 
Sri Mulyaningsih
Sri Mulyaningsih was another volunteer who acted on her own. She 
worked selling gudeg (prepared jackfruit) in the Banjarsari area. She 
decided to volunteer independently for two main reasons. First, she did 
not want to be ordered about by other groups, and second, because she 
felt that such groups' activities were ineffective in gathering support. 
Unlike most volunteers discussed here, Mulyaningsih had a lengthy his-
tory of activism and political activity. In the early 1980s, when she was 
still in senior high school, she was a member of the Youth Red Cross in 
Yogyakarta. In 1985, she became a member of PDI in Yogyakarta, acting 
as a ﬁeld coordinator for fundraising. In 1990, she married, and over 
the next ten years she withdrew from activism. In 1999, she moved to 
Surakarta, where she decided to again become active in politics follow-
ing the drastic political changes in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto in 
1998 (interview with Mulyaningsih, 16 September 2014). Mulyaningsih's 
case indicates that Reformasi both created space for activists to return 
to Indonesian politics and gave them a motive to do so.
Mulyaningsih began actively supporting Jokowi during the 2012 
Jakarta gubernatorial election, when she joined the Bekasi-based move-
ment 'Sundari 3 Jari' (Three Finger Sundari). Through the training of-
fered by this group, she obtained the knowledge and skills needed to 
work with others in new situations. In the lead-up to the 2014 presiden-
tial election, she received further training during a ﬁve-day congress in 
Jakarta, sponsored by the women's branch of BARA JP. She got further 
experience when she joined the campaign teams of several PDI-P can-
didates competing for seats in the Surakarta and national parliaments 
– Roy Saputro, Didik Prasetyo and Indra Kramadipa – with the support 
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of Unggul, a member of the National Team for Jokowi (Tim Nasional 
Jokowi) and the Coalition for a Great Indonesia (Rumah Koalisi Indo-
nesia Hebat).
Although she was independent, Mulyaningsih also communi-
cated with other volunteers, including those in Jakarta. She also had 
a POSTERA identity card, which she used pragmatically to ease her 
own movement. She emphasized that, going by her experiences, such 
an identity card was useful evidence of legitimacy to show suspicious 
potential voters, and it served as a 'password' of sorts to ensure access 
to volunteer organizations. For example, her membership of POSTERA 
allowed her to join the Srikandi Congress of BARA JP, which required 
participants to be members of certain groups (interview with Mulyan-
ingsih, 18 August 2014). Many of the campaign material she used were 
purchased with her own funds. Unggul also offered some material 
support for her activities, including campaign aids such as stickers, 
pins and banners. 
Mulyaningsih campaigned for Jokowi both online and ofﬂine. Online, 
she used Facebook to combat lies and attacks. Owing to her ability to 
'cut through' her opponents' attacks, she became known as 'Sri Gunting' 
(Lady Scissors). Ofﬂine, she was involved in door-to-door campaign ac-
tivities in many regions, including Bekonang in Sukoharjo Regency and 
Purwodadi in Grobogan Regency, some 67 kilometres from Surakarta, 
as well as coastal Gunungkidul in Yogyakarta Province. During her 
activities, she brought campaign materials such as pins, stickers and 
banners, to facilitate communication with potential voters. 
Although Mulyaningsih was an individual volunteer, she did not 
work on her own. Her husband, Agus Purwoko, played an important 
role in facilitating her mobility. Together, they went to different regions 
without any prior planning. Their efforts were widely discussed and 
appreciated among other volunteers, as shown by Mulyaningsih being 
selected as one of 88 volunteers sent to a national BARA JP event in 
Surabaya on 31 August 2014. As with other volunteers, Mulyaningsih 
adapted her activities in the face of local developments and the funds 
available to her. During Ramadan, for instance, she distributed takjil – in 
the form of gudeg – in Banyuanyar. When she received 1,000 soursop 
seedlings from PROSPERA, she distributed them to the ethnic Chinese 
community in Surakarta. Meanwhile, her stickers and other materials, 
aside from being used during her door-to-door campaigning, were 
also distributed along the main roads of Surakarta (MT Haryono and 
Ahmad Yani). On election day, 9 July 2014, she distributed 400 portions 
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of gudeg as a form of thanksgiving. She again distributed food when 
the General Elections Committee formally announced Jokowi's victory 
on 23 July 2014.
Mulyaningsih's knowledge of Jokowi was unique, as he had frequent-
ed her renowned gudeg stall in Surakarta. She decided to become a vol-
unteer because she was impressed by his simplicity and concern for the 
poor. As such, she was certain that he could offer honest governance and 
lower market prices. She considered her volunteering a form of protest 
against the government's poor performance to date. As she stated in her 
interview, volunteering was her way to 'demand positive change'. This 
argument signiﬁes two points: aside from Jokowi's charisma, social class 
identiﬁcations were an important factor in the decision to volunteer, as 
was candidates' capacity to deliver on their promises. 
Concluding Remarks: Implications for Democracy
The discussion has indicated various key points. First, the rise and 
expansion of volunteerism in Indonesia is linked closely to changes in 
the process through which presidents are selected, from indirect elec-
tions through the People's Consultative Assembly to direct popular 
elections. This shift has challenged party elites' monopoly and offered 
the public previously unimagined space for political activity, as shown 
by volunteer groups becoming prominent in Jokowi's successful presi-
dential campaign in 2014. At the same time, this shift has opened space 
for alternative leaders who may enter politics through non-traditional 
channels. Jokowi is part of this process. Far from simply becoming a 
'new leader', he was perceived as the embodiment of good leadership, 
being surrounded by 'innocent people' and having the capacity to ef-
fectively deliver government programmes. 
Second, the rise of pro-Jokowi volunteers indicates a transformation of 
ideas and practices around volunteerism. A sense of personal obligation 
to a particular recipient and a feeling of spontaneity have become central 
to volunteers' motivations and approaches. This is diametrically opposed 
to classical understandings of volunteerism. Third, the data collected 
indicates that only six to ten members of each volunteer group are active. 
However, these people have the capacity to expand their social bases, 
become properly involved and transform stand-by citizens into political 
actors. Fourth, volunteer groups' selection of issues, activities, media and 
approaches have been sufﬁcient to transform them into colossi with a 
signiﬁcant presence both online and ofﬂine. Fifth, this article has shown 
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another interesting aspect: comparison of volunteers' proﬁles, both as 
groups and individuals, indicates that volunteerism as an overarching 
movement is classless, gender blind and age blind, while volunteerism 
in its organizational forms at the local grassroots level seems to be class 
based, gender based and/or age based.  
Finally, in relation to the future of Indonesian democracy, amidst 
the expansion of political pragmatism in Indonesian elections, the rise 
of volunteer movements has reinvigorated the spirit of activism and 
volunteerism in the political process, including funding. In Indonesia, 
where the public does not trust 'electoral institutions', this has pro-
moted optimism for the future. Examining the organizational models, 
approaches, methods and motivations used by pro-Jokowi groups, it is 
clear not only that citizen-initiated campaigns have become integral to 
restoring activism and volunteerism as foundations for democracy, but 
that this has occurred without consideration of class or gender. This sug-
gests a promising future for Indonesian democracy. However, to what 
extent this optimism will be converted into tangible beneﬁts remains 
unknown. Volunteerism in Indonesia is still in its formative phase, and 
thus it requires time to develop as an ideology, political movement and 
organizational model and thereby support democratization. 
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10  Kaligis 2015, 'Mengenang Tragedi Berdarah 27 Juli 1996' (Remembering the Bloody 
Tragedy of 27 July 1996), http://www.berdikarionline.com/mengenang-tragedi-
berdarah-27-juli-1996/ (accessed 5 June 2016).
11  Committee for General Elections 2008, 'Pemilu 1999' (Election of 1999), http://www.
kpu.go.id/index.php/pages/detail/2008/11/Pemilu-1999 (accessed 7 June 2016).
12  Arie Sunaryo 2014, 'PDI-P Rajai Perolehan Suara Pileg di Solo' (PDI-P Leads in Votes 
for Legislative Election in Solo), Merdeka.com. http://www.merdeka.com/politik/
pdip-rajai-perolehan-suara-pileg-di-solo.html (accessed 5 June 2016). 
13  JASMEV was launched on 12 August 2012. It was designed to convey informa-
tion about Jokowi and Ahok through social media (Twitter, Facebook, Kaskus, 
YouTube) and the blogosphere. During the 2014 presidential election, JASMEV 
was transformed into 'Jokowi Advanced Social Media Volunteers' and dedicated 
to campaigning for Jokowi.
14  The Relawan Garuda Social Media actively campaigned on Facebook, Twitter and 
the blogosphere for Central Javan gubernatorial candidate Ganjar Pranowo and his 
running mate Heru Sudjatmoko.
15  Erik Amna and Joakim Ekman identify three types of citizens: active citizens, 
manifestly passive citizens and stand-by citizens, who 'stay alert, keep themselves 
informed about politics, and are willing and able to participate if needed. In short, 
they can be seen as potential political participants, which contrasts with citizens 
who are genuinely passive by virtue of doing nothing and by shunning politics 
altogether'.
16  When ﬁrst established, BARA JP was intended to urge Megawati Soekarnoputri 
and PDI-P to nominate Jokowi as their presidential candidate, a mission realized 
by collecting signatures, ﬁngerprints and identity cards. Its founders included Sihol 
Manullang, Syafti Hidayat, Utje Gustaaf Patty and Ferdinandus Semaun.
17  Seknas Jokowi was established on 15 December 2013. Its administrators included 
Dadang Juliantara, M. Yamin, Samuel Pangarepan, Antonius Prajasto and Sereida 
Tambunan. It served as the national secretariat of various regional organizations, 
communities and initiatives that supported the presidential candidacy and election 
of Jokowi. Branches of Seknas Jokowi included Seknas Muda Jokowi, Seknas Per-
empuan Pendukung Jokowi (National Secretariat of Women Supporting Jokowi), 
Seknas Petani Jokowi (National Secretariat of Farmers for Jokowi), Seknas Advokat 
Jokowi (National Secretariat of Lawyers for Jokowi) and Seknas PKL Jokowi (Na-
tional Secretariat of Street Vendors for Jokowi). The administrators of Seknas Muda 
Jokowi at the national level were Ajianto Dwi Nugroho and RirinSefsani.
18  The word takjil originates from Arabic and means 'refreshment'. More speciﬁcally, 
it refers to the refreshment breaking the fast with a starter dish. 
19  This information, which originated from an interview with Tiead Andika Gilham, 
was conﬁrmed by Y. Dasanta, the head of POSTERA for Central Java. Surakarta, 27 
August 2014.
20  This information, which originated from an interview with Tiead Andika Gilham, 
was conﬁrmed by Paulus Hartoyo, 12 September 2014, and Aria Bima, 17 September 
2014.
21  PDI-P announced Jokowi's candidacy on 14 March 2014.
22  The name Sahabat Jokowi was found not only in Surakarta, but also at the national 
level. However, the Sahabat Jokowi in Surakarta was unrelated to the one at the 
national level.
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